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ABSTRACT  
 
Scholars often assume that Arab legislation including Egypt accommodates honor crimes. 
Two pieces of Egyptian legislation that receive attention are Article 237 which reduce the 
sanction to the husband who kills his adulterous wife upon committing adultery, and Article 
17 which empowers courts in felonies to give leniency whenever they see appropriate. They 
believe that Article 237 of the Egyptian penal code limits the reduction in sanctions to the 
husbands while excluding other male paternal relatives. To accommodate this exclusion, they 
assume that Article 17 of the penal code indirectly entrenches the scope of protection to cover 
other male relatives and not only husbands. In their minds, this guarantees the perpetrators of 
honor crimes lenient punishment constituting a safe escape from serious prosecution. An 
examination of approximately 1,550 appeals submitted before the Egyptian Court of 
Cassation from 1934 to 2014 that involve the application of Article 17 of the penal code 
challenges these assumptions. It shows that the leniency of courts is not necessarily applied 
every time a crime of honor is brought before them. The examination of the appeals 
submitted before the Egyptian Court of Cassation assumes that honor crimes are not 
necessarily the most common crimes to which the leniency of the judiciary is applied. 
Leniency is assumed to be applied to other crimes including murders not involving honor, 
illicit possession of drugs and weapons, bribery and several others. This research concludes 
that leniency is assumed to be often given to a wide range of crimes including crimes 
involving honor.  
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I. Introduction 
 
Honor crimes have been defined as longstanding and ancient practices in which male family 
members kill women for bringing dishonor to the family.
1
 Women are presumed to disgrace 
their families by carrying out sexual acts outside marriage.
2
 Sometimes such crimes are 
committed on the mere suspicion of women being engaged in sexual affairs beyond the scope 
of legitimate marriage.  
 
In Egypt, honor crimes are not spelled out within its legislation. In spite of this absence, 
however, some scholars assume that Egypt fully accommodates honor crimes in the penal 
code through both Article17, which empowers courts to give leniency to whatever felonies 
they deem appropriate based on the circumstances at hand, and Article 237 which gives a 
reduction in sanction to the husband who kills his adulterous wife.
3
 Scholars believe that 
Article 17 of the penal code guarantees the perpetrators of honor crimes, who do not fall 
under the scope of reduction in sanction embodied in Article 237 of the code, less serious 
prosecutions. They propose that it is not only husbands who often benefit from a reduction 
similar to the one stipulated in Article 237 of the penal code but male paternal relatives as 
well. They see that Article 17 of the penal code indirectly entrenches the scope of protection 
to cover other male relatives not only husbands.  
 
This paper argues that such an assumption is challenged in light of the examination of the 
appeals submitted before the Egyptian Court of Cassation involving the application of Article 
17 of the penal code. The examination this thesis reveals to a considerable extent an 
approximate image to the actual extent of the application of leniency by courts. In actuality, 
the analysis suggested assumes that leniency of courts is applied in a broad manner often well 
beyond the crimes of honor. Court leniency is extended to a wide range of additional crimes 
including murder for reasons apart from honor, illicit possession of drugs, bribery and several 
others. The leniency in Article 17 is not necessarily a complementary article to Article 237 of 
the penal code which guarantees the perpetrators of honor of crimes less serious prosecution. 
Leniency is also not necessarily applied every single time it is brought before the courts.  
                                                 
1
 Yadav, Supriya, For the sake of honor: but whose honor? Honor crimes against women, 5 Asia-Pac. J. on 
Hum. Rts. & L. 64-65 (2004). 
2
  John A. Cohan, Honor Killings And The Cultural Defense, 40 Cal. W. Int'l L.J. 191 (2009-2010). 
3
 See Lama Abu-Odeh, Comparatively Speaking: Honor Of The East And Passion Of The West, 1997 Utah L. 
Rev. 290 (1997); Lama Abu-Odeh, Honor Killings And The Construction Of Gender In Arab Societies, 58 Am. 
J. Comp. L. 928, 931 (2010); LYNN WELCHMAN & SARA HOSSAIN, 'HONOUR': CRIMES, PARADIGMS & 
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 143-144 Chapter 6 (Zed Books 2005) (2008); Fatma Khafagy, Honour Killing in 
Egypt, 8-9 (May 2005) http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/egm/vaw-
gp2005/docs/experts/khafagy.honorcrimes.pdf. 
2 
 
 
The first chapter of this paper presents the definition, roots, and justification for honor killing, 
with a focus on Egypt’s position on honor crimes. The second chapter analyzes the literature 
on honor crimes in Egypt and the Middle East written in both Arabic and English. The third 
chapter elucidates the concept of leniency adopted under Article 17 of the Egyptian penal 
code, its scope of application and regulation. The authority of the court of cassation upon the 
application of Article 17 of the penal code is also discussed. The final chapter analyzes the 
appeals submitted before the Egyptian Court of Cassation relating to the application of 
Article 17 of the penal code. 
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Chapter I 
II. Honor Crimes under Egyptian Legislation 
 
A. The definition of honor crimes: 
 
The longstanding and ancient practice of Honor crimes often takes place when male family 
members kill women for bringing dishonor to the family.
4
 The latter have a burden not to 
disgrace their families by carrying out sexual acts outside marriage.
5
 These crimes may be 
committed on the mere suspicion of women being engaged in sexual affairs beyond the scope 
of legitimate marriage.  
 
Having a closer look on the term honor under Arabic language, it is defined under few Arabic 
wordings. These wordings generally pour in the same frame of the concept of honor. They 
form altogether the concept of honor under Arabic language. The meaning of the word honor 
meets the following Arabic terms ‘ird, sharaf and karama. The first refers to honor, good 
repute and dignity, while the second refers to nobility, high rank, eminence, distinction, honor 
and glory and finally the last means nobility, honor and respect.
6
 
 
In Middle East, the concept of honor has been closely attached to the woman’s 
virginity/chastity. Women living in the region of the Middle East are expected to preserve 
their chastity. Such chastity can be represented in an unmarried women’s will to keep their 
virginity till they reach the age of marriage. Chastity would last even after marriage as 
women have to preserve the honor of their marriage. Chastity of women is meant to preserve 
the honor of their families and husbands and that the former do not bring disgrace on their 
families by departing from honor’s code of conduct, within a certain society. The honor code 
may include the way women should be dressed, talk and live within the accepted norms set 
by such society. 
 
Women’s failure to stick to the code of honor may result into aggressive reactions emanating 
from the male family members towards these women. The aggressiveness of such reactions 
may mount to honor killings. Honor related killings exist whenever women are believed to be 
disgracing their families. Women who cannot preserve their chastity are considered as failing 
                                                 
4
 Yadav, Supra note 1, at 64-65.  
5
 Cohan, Supra note 2, at 191. 
6
 Beth Baron, Women, Honour and the State: Evidence from Egypt, 42 Midd. East. Studies J. 1 (2006).  
4 
 
to preserve the honor of their families and would consequently face the severe consequences 
to such failure.  
 
B. Responsibility for honor: 
 
Honor in many countries especially in the Middle East region has been considered as the 
responsibility of husbands and other paternal relatives. Accordingly the perpetrators of most 
of the crimes involving honor are male family members. The problem which most of the 
literature available on honor crimes point out is that some Arab criminal codes provide for a 
special treatment for male family members who perpetrate such type of crime. They propose 
that such special treatment can be witnessed in the reduction in or even the exemption from 
sanction granted by some of these criminal codes to the male family members who commit 
crimes of honor. 
 
The special treatment, which the literature available highlights, varies depending on the 
ideology adopted within the legislation of different countries. They claim that most of the 
Arab legislations provide for partial or total exemption from sanction to perpetrators of honor 
killings. The exemption from sanction differs in terms of the scope of application, the kind of 
act committed to which the exemption applies and who should benefit from such exemption.
7
  
 
As for the scope of application, it varies by whether it grants a full exemption from 
punishment or a reduction in sanction to the perpetrators of honor crimes. The Jordanian code 
for instance, grant a full exemption from punishment to the husband who catches his wife 
committing adultery,
8
 while in the same case the Egyptian would grant a partial exemption 
from punishment to husbands and not a whole exemption as the former code does.
9
 
 
As for the kind of act committed to which the exemption applies, it varies according to the act 
itself. For example, the Egyptian code limits the acts to which such partial exemption applies 
to the act of adultery while the Jordanian code expands the exemption to include situations 
other than situation of adultery or equivocal attitudes.
10
 Accordingly, the exemption is 
sometimes extended to include more situations than the situation of adultery. 
 
                                                 
7
 Abu-Odeh, Supra note 3, at 294. 
8
 Law No. 16 of 1960 (Criminal Code of 1960, reformed in 2011), Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiyya 1 Jan. 1960, Article 
340 (Jordan) 
9
 Law No. 58 of 1937 (Criminal Code of 1937, reformed in 1952), Al-Waqi’a al-Misriyah 5 Aug. 1937, Article 
237 (Egypt) 
10
 Abu-Odeh, Supra note 3, at 294. 
5 
 
While as for the ones who benefit from the exemption, the codes differ in terms of whom 
they count as beneficiaries of the exemption. Under Egyptian code it is limited to the 
husbands excluding all other paternal relatives, while under the Jordanian code the umbrella 
is expanded to include all the female’s male family members , not only husbands so that it 
encompasses whomever cannot marry the female caught in the sexual act for blood, nursing 
and marriage reasons.   
 
C. Roots of honor killings: 
 
Examinations of the roots of honor crimes in the Middle East usually incorporate the 
relationship between Islamic Sharia and honor related violence. The debate on the 
relationship between Islamic Sharia and honor crimes is recognized but beyond the scope of 
this paper. Nevertheless, it is notable that many acknowledge that honor crimes pre-date most 
religions including Islam.
11
 Many propose that honor crimes roots are found in ancient 
Bedouin and desert tribal traditions and mentalities.
12
  
 
It is believed that honor killings existed among ancient tribal communities living in the desert 
before the existence of modern religious.
13
 Such practice is assumed to exist before Quran. A 
Muslim tribe leader once stated that "[m]en's honor comes before the Book”.14 The practice is 
not based on Quran or any other Islamic teaching.
15
 
 
Centuries ago, the custom of protection of honor by male members of the family evolved 
within tribal communities in the desert.
16
 And it has been believed that the protection of 
honor is a male duty to kill any female member who get engaged in an inappropriate sexual 
act.
17
 The custom embodying the practice has developed and continued to exist even within 
some of the modern pieces of legislation and different cultures.
18
 The adoption of such 
practice can be also present even there stands a law which does not allow for such practice 
                                                 
11
 See Johanna Bond, Honor As A Property, 23 Colum. J. Gender & L. 216 (2012); Catherine Warrick, The 
Vanishing Victim: Criminal Law And Gender In Jordan, 39 Law & Soc'y Rev. 324 (2005); John A. Cohan, 
Honor Killings And The Cultural Defense, 40 Cal. W. Int'l L.J. 196 (2009-2010); Christina A. Maddek, Killing 
Dishonor: Effective Eradication Of Honor Killing, 29 Suffolk Transnat'l L. Rev. 54 (2005-2006); Rachel A. 
Ruane Ruane, Murder In The Name Of Honor: Violence Against Women In Jordan And Pakistan, 14 Emory Int'l 
L. Rev. 1530 (2000). 
12
 Id. 
13
 Cohan, Supra note 2, at 196. 
14
 Id. 
15
 Id. 
16
 Christina A. Maddek, Killing Dishonor: Effective Eradication Of Honor Killing, 29 Suffolk Transnat'l L. Rev. 
54 (2005-2006) 
17
 Id. at 54-55. 
18
 Rachel A. Ruane, Murder In The Name Of Honor: Violence Against Women In Jordan AndPakistan, 14 
Emory Int'l L. Rev. 1549 (2000). 
6 
 
within Arab tribal law, as administered by tribe leaders in the absence of a strong state to 
enforce such prohibition.
19
 
 
In modern history, some argue that Egypt, as well as other Arab countries, has borrowed what 
serves the concept of honor from western legislation as the French laws.
20
 In this regard, one 
main legal source most Arab countries relied on was the French Penal Code of 1810.
21
 The 
French code embodied articles which helped the concept of protection of honor by male 
family members to exist. For instance, the Jordanian, Syrian and Lebanese penal codes 
borrowed the terms female-ascendants and descendants from the French code, thus extending 
the benefit to husbands, fathers, sons and brothers.
22
 The Egyptian, Tunisian and Kuwaiti 
codes limited the benefit from such acts to the husbands.
23
 
 
In light of the existence of penal codes as such, transgressors of the code of honor often face 
violent reaction from the guardians of the code; male members of the family.
24
 Violence may 
be represented in beating, stabbing and in many instances killing the woman to regain the 
honor of the family. Several communities believe that honor related crimes are tools to 
remove the stains of dishonor where perpetrators of such crimes are believed by these 
communities to be idols for preserving the honor of their families.
25
 Some believe that the 
sole escape from honor disgrace is blood; they assume that blood cleanses honor.
26
  
 
Honor killing still stands as a problematic issue in the Middle East. According to United 
Nations for Population Activities, a report in the year 2000 states that 5,000 women and girls 
were killed by the members of their families for the failure of preserving their chastity and 
the honor of their families.
27
  
 
D. Justification for honor killing: 
 
                                                 
19
 Baron, Supra note 6, at 3. 
20
 See Catherine Warrick, The Vanishing Victim: Criminal Law And Gender In Jordan, 39 Law & Soc'y Rev. 
334 (2005); Melissa Spatz, A "Lesser" Crime: A Comparative Study of Legal Defenses for Men Who Kill Their 
Wives, 24 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 601 (1991); Lama Abu-Odeh, Comparatively Speaking: Honor Of The 
East And Passion Of The West, 1997 Utah L. Rev. 295 (1997). 
21
 Abu-Odeh, Supra note 3, at 295. 
22
 Id. at 294. 
23
 Id. 
24
 WELCHMAN, Supra note 3, at 42-63.  
25
 Yadav, Supra note 1, at 65. 
26
 Ruane, Supra note 18, at 1523. 
27
 UNFPA, Lives Together, Worlds Apart: Men and Women in a Time of Change, 5 (2000) 
http://www.unfpa.org/publications/state-world-population-2000#sthash.ewRDmld1.dpuf. 
7 
 
It is believed that most Arab legislation accommodates crimes involving honor. Such 
accommodation may be in the form of exemption from or reduction in sanction for the 
perpetrators of such crimes. The exemption or reduction in sanction for the perpetrators of 
honor crimes is justified on various bases. One, is that the male family members are deemed 
as the guardians of the family honor. Second, is the provocation state under which the male 
member of the family gets influenced and perpetrate his crime.  
 
The first justification stems from the roots of honor killing. It is assumed that the male 
members of the family are the ones responsible for the preserving its honor. Women 
themselves are also expected to carry the burden preserving their honor and the honor of their 
families. The latter are expected to do so by sticking to the code of honor adopted within the 
society they live in. It is believed that if women preserve their honor and do not surpass the 
limits set by the societies they are living within, accordingly, they are preserving the honor of 
their families. On the one hand man’s honor is crucially built on his ability to guard and 
control his womenfolk’s behavior, especially their sexual behavior.28 While on the other 
hand, women are expected not to disgrace or dishonor their family.
29
 In Arab societies, men 
are obliged to determine acceptable patterns of behavior for their women and the latter must 
stick to the patterns set by the former.
30
 The basic elements of honor can be summed up in the 
control over women behavior, threat to the honor of the family and the societal 
involvement.
31
 In situations where a woman surpasses the limits accepted within the society 
she lives in by engaging in inappropriate sexual acts or catching a bad reputation may face 
serious troubles which may mount to getting killed in the name of honor by the guardians of 
the family honor; male family members. 
 
Another primary justification for honor crimes is believed to be provocation in situations of 
adultery.
32
 A provoked male family member who kills his female relative for finding the 
latter engaged in a wrongful sexual act may benefit from an exemption or reduction in 
sanction.  
 
                                                 
28
 DANIEL G. BATES & AMAL RASSAM, PEOPLES AND CULTURES OF THE MIDDLE EAST 211-239 (Prentice-Hall, 
Inc., 1983) (1983). 
29
 Abu-Odeh, Supra note 3, at 916-19. 
30
 TAHIRE KOCTURK, A MATTER OF HONOUR: EXPERIENCES OF TURKISH WOMEN IMMIGRANTS 33-58 (London; 
Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Zed Books, 1992) (1992). 
31
 NANCY V. BAKER, ET AL, FAMILY KILLING FIELDS: HONOUR RATIONALES IN THE MURDER OF WOMEN, 
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 164-184 (February 1999) (1999).  
32
 Donna K. Coker, Heat Of Passion And Wife Killing: Men Who Batter/Men Who Kill, 2 S. Cal. Rev. L. & 
Women’s Stud. 80 (1992-93).  
8 
 
On the one hand, jurists under English and American systems usually refer to adultery as the 
ideal example of adequate provocation for honor killing.
33
 Sexual provocation upon the sight 
of a wife’s adultery is recognized as an adequate provocation to decrease the severity of the 
murder crime.
34
 Under many jurisdictions, sexual provocation is used as a cultural self-
defense.
35
 Abusive men’s primary excuse for their violence is being “out of control” induced 
from the victim’s provocation which led them to lose control.36 
 
Provocation is considered justifiable within certain limits. Such limits differ according to the 
competent legal system. Under common law, the four elements which govern voluntary 
manslaughter doctrine are: 
a. A provocation reached by a reasonable man to the heat of passion, 
b. The provocation is a result of heat of passion, 
c. There was no time for a reasonable man to cool off, 
d. The perpetrator did not cool off till the time he committed his crime. 37 
 
Common law jurisdictions adopt the concept of provocation as long as it falls within the 
category of adequate provocation. The construction of such adequacy, often named as 
common law categories of adequate provocation, are specific and can be framed in the 
presence of serious battery, aggravated assault, the commission of the crime against a close 
relative and the witnessing of the wife committing adultery by a husband.
38
  
 
The main question in regards to crimes of honor committed under the American system rests 
in whether the perpetrator was provoked by the deceased and that he acted rashly and under 
the spell of hot blood and passion leading him to act without judgment. The answer to that 
question lies in whether the criteria of adequacy are met or not. Accordingly the questions 
would be formulated as whether the provocation was adequate to create the heat of passion, 
whether there was enough time for the accused to cool off and whether the accused 
                                                 
33
 Id., at 72. 
34
 Id. 
35
 See John A. Cohan, Honor Killings And The Cultural Defense, 40 Cal. W. Int'l L.J. 196 (2009-2010); 
Christina A. Maddek, Killing Dishonor: Effective Eradication Of Honor Killing, 29 Suffolk Transnat'l L. Rev. 
64 (2005-2006). 
36
 Coker, Supra note 32, at 75. 
37
 Coker, Supra note 32, at 79 (1992-93), Dolores A. Donovan, Stephanie M. Wildman, Is The Resonable Man 
Obsolete? A Critical Perspective On Selfdefense And Provocation, 14 Loy. L. A. L. Rev. 448 (1980-1981). 
38
 Abu-Odeh, Supra note 3, at 296. 
9 
 
committed his crime as a result of the heat of passion produced on seeing the deceased 
committing adultery.
39
 Under all scenarios such adequacy is left to the courts to determine.
40
 
 
On the other hand, Arab legislations also recognize the provocation as a justification for 
honor crimes. They, however, differ in the expansion of the concept of provocation in terms 
of who should benefit from acting under such concept. In general, Arab legislation tends to 
adopt the concept of honor rather than passion.
41
 Their codes are more accommodating in 
extending the concept of provocation to the perpetrators of honor crimes. They extend the 
concept to include the paternal relatives not only to the husband but also the father, brother 
and son.  
 
Abu-Odeh portrays the status of Arab legislation towards honor crimes.
42
 She elucidates that 
Arab legislations differ in this regard on two main issues. The first issue rests on limiting the 
defense of provocation to incidents of adultery and providing a reduction and not an 
exemption in penalty. This can be best exemplified under the Egyptian, Tunisian, Libyan and 
Kuwaiti penal codes.
43
 While other codes expand provocation to wider range of incidents 
which includes unlawful bed that stretches to include all other sexual practices short to 
adultery like under the Jordanian penal code. 
 
The second Arab legislation issue relates to who should benefit from the justification of 
honor crimes. Since Syrian and Lebanese penal codes have adopted French terminology 
female ascendants and descendants; accordingly the ones who benefit from the justification 
are the fathers, brothers and sons of the deceased.
44
 The Jordanian penal code even extends 
the scope of application of the excuse to include other sexual acts short to adultery.
45
  
 
Article 340 of the Jordanian code portrays the construction of such an extended application. 
The article stipulates the following: 
 
He who catches his wife, or one of his (female) un-lawfuls committing 
adultery with another, and he kills, wounds, or injures one or both of 
them, is exempt from any penalty. He who catches his wife, or one of 
his (female) ascendants, descendants or sisters with another in an 
                                                 
39
 M. D. G., Manslaughter And The Adequacy Of Provocation: The Reasonablness Of The Reasonable Man, 106 
U. Pa. L. Rev.  1022 (1957-1958).  
40
 Abu-Odeh, Supra note 3, at 296. 
41
 See Abu-Odeh, Supra note 3, at 287-307. 
42
 Id., at 911-52. 
43
 Id., at 915. 
44
 Id. 
45
 Female unlawful is a male who cannot marry the woman for blood, nursing or marriage in law reasons. 
10 
 
unlawful bed, and he kills or wounds or injures one or both of them, 
benefits from a reduction of penalty. 
 
Article 340 of the Jordanian penal code grants the provoked husband who catches his wife 
committing adultery a full exemption from penalty. It also provides for a reduction in penalty 
for those who injure, wound or kill their female ascendants and descendants for being in 
unlawful bed with another. The Jordanian code is clearly more accommodating towards 
honor rather than passion.
46
  
 
Dishonoring under Jordanian penal code is a collective injury to the father, brother, son and 
any other male relative. It is not individualistic in being limited only to males who could be 
sexually connected to the female, primarily husbands.
47
 The idea of collectivism of honor 
also applies to both Syrian and Lebanese penal codes since they adopt the same concept of 
female ascendants and descendants.
48
  
 
A contrary scenario to the extension of excuse, as under the Jordanian, is found in the 
Algerian penal code. The Algerian penal code provides for both the husband and the wife to 
benefit from a reduction in sanction if s/he who catches her/his partner committing adultery.
49
 
By granting – equally - both husband and wife the right to benefit from such reduction in 
penalty reflects the fact that the Algerian code is more accommodating to the concept of 
passion rather than the concept of honor while most of the other Arab codes excludes female 
family members from the beneficiaries. 
 
E. Where Egypt stands from honor killings:  
 
In Egypt, honor killings are regulated in the penal code under the section of indecent assaults 
and corruption of morals. The Egyptian penal code does not recognize provocation in 
criminal matters unless in situations of adultery. However, Article 237 of the Egyptian penal 
code stipulates that a husband who kills his wife in situation of adultery benefits from a 
reduction in sanction. The justification behind such reduction in sanction is that the husband 
gets provoked by the sight of his wife in bed with another man thus he kills his wife and 
                                                 
46
 Abu-Odeh, Supra note 3, at 296. 
47
 Id., at 293. 
48
 Id., at 294. 
49
 Law No. 66 of 1966 (Criminal Code of 1966, reformed in 2006), Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiyya 8 Jun. 1966, Article 
279 (Algeria) 
11 
 
partner in adultery.
50
 The reduction in sanction it provides for is to the husband who kills his 
wife by surprise upon catching them committing adultery.
51
 
 
Article 237 of Egyptian penal code grants a reduction of penalty for the provoked husband 
who kills his wife on the spot catching her red-handed committing adultery.
52
 The article 
stipulates that a husband who catches his wife committing the crime of adultery with another 
and kills her or her partner immediately shall be punished with imprisonment instead of the 
sanctions stipulated in articles 234 and 236.
53
 This means that the husband who kills his wife 
under such a condition, instead of being tried as a perpetrator of a felony is charged with a 
misdemeanor. 
 
Unlike the Algerian penal code, the Egyptian penal code does not grant such a right to both 
husbands and wives. Under the latter women are not entitled to a reduction in sanction. 
Accordingly, if a woman surprises her husband while committing adultery with another and 
she kills him, she is punished for intentional killing under article 234 – a felony – as the 
reduction in sanction is exclusively stipulated as being for men alone. 
 
The Egyptian legislator sets down three conditions for the provoked husband to benefit from 
the reduction in penalty stipulated under article 237 of the Egyptian penal code. In regards to 
the adultery of the wife, the conditions set for the proper application of the article are almost 
similar to the conditions set for the adequate provocation under the American system.
54
 The 
conditions stipulated are the following:  
1. The identity of the perpetrator 
2. Provocation upon surprise 
3. The immediate killing 55 
 
                                                 
50
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As for the first condition, the perpetrator has to be the husband of the female who was caught 
red-handed committing adultery. Only he is entitled to such a reduction in penalty, and not 
any other paternal relative.
56
 He has to be the lawful husband according to the Egyptian code 
of personal status matters. 
 
The second condition requires that the provoked husband, in order to be protected by article 
237, surprises his wife immediately on committing adultery.
57
 A husband should be provoked 
by virtue of surprise in seeing his wife committing the crime of adultery, thus raising the heat 
of passion leading to the rash killing of her or her partner. 
 
The last condition is related to the absence of a cooling off period where the husband kills his 
wife on the spot upon being surprised by seeing her committing adultery with another. No 
cooling-off period may intervene between the husband’s shock at seeing his wife committing 
adultery and the actual act of killing if it does, the husband is deprived of such protection.
58
 
 
The legal effect of such reduction is that if the three conditions are met the nature of the 
crime changes from being a felony to being a misdemeanor. The husband who kills his wife 
would be sentenced to three years of imprisonment instead of facing capital punishment or to 
a labor punishment of twenty five years. Added to that, since the reduction in sanction applies 
to an act of murder then it also extends to the less violent acts. The reduction extends to cases 
other than killing such as when the husband attempts to murder his wife but he fails leaving 
her with permanent disability. In a felony lessened to a misdemeanor sanctioned by 
imprisonment,
59
 thus the competent court is the first instance court – the court competent for 
hearing cases of misdemeanors – to decide the case.60 
 
In general, Arab legislation lies between two poles; the first is represented by the Algerian 
code while the Jordanian code represents the other. The former, by granting spouses the same 
right to reduction in penalty, is a clear reflection of the concept of passion, while the latter by 
granting exemption from penalty to men who catch their wives committing adultery, and 
reduction in penalty of men who catch their female family members in bed with another 
committing adultery responds to the concept of honor.
61
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Egypt’s positive position regarding honor crimes is be midway between the two poles. The 
Egyptian penal code under Article 237 provides for a reduction in sanction as an exclusive 
excuse for the husband and not the wife. Both Egyptian and Algerian codes exclude males 
who cannot be sexually connected to females via the extension of application of reduction in 
punishment.
62
  
 
Although Egypt limits the reduction in sanction stipulated under Article 247 of the penal code 
to the husband, nevertheless, most of the literature available on honor crimes in Egypt assume 
that Egyptian judiciary extends the same benefit stipulated for the husband under the penal 
code. They claim that Egyptian judiciary circumvents the limitation stipulated under Article 
237 of the penal code and extend the same treatment to paternal relatives other than the 
husband by applying Article 17 of the Egyptian penal codes to the perpetrators of honor 
crimes. 
 
Article 17 of the Egyptian penal code entitles judges, in felonies, to use their leniency on 
crimes wherever they see necessary.
63
 Leniency of judiciary rests in their discretionary power 
to reduce punishment whenever necessary according to the circumstances of the crime or the 
act committed. A judge may replace the sanction of capital punishment by the penalty of life 
hard labor, permanent hard labor penalty by temporary hard labor or imprisonment, 
temporary hard labor with imprisonment or confinement not less than six months and finally 
an imprisonment sentence may be replaced with a confinement penalty of not less than three 
months. 
 
F. Leniency under Egyptian Penal Code: 
 
It is believed that the Egyptian penal code limits the reduction in sanction under Article 237 
of the penal code to husbands and excludes other paternal relatives. Nevertheless, the 
literature available on honor crimes in Egypt argues that Egyptian judiciary implicitly tends 
to recognize crimes of honor.  
 
Legal scholars assume that crimes of honor are compromised through the use of Article 17 of 
the penal code by judges.
64
 Some contend that Article 17 of the penal code is frequently used 
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by judges in cases where crimes of honor are involved.
65
 Judges are believed to be sending an 
implicit message that they will not tolerate illegitimate sexual practices by finding an escape 
through the leniency entitled to them.
66
 They note the fact that judges can apply Article 17 of 
the penal code based on their sole discretion. They believe that judges in Egypt resort to 
available alternative concepts such as the concept of leniency to provide the male family 
members who commit honor crimes an escape from punishment.
67
 
 
Some believe that courts under the concept of leniency secure successful prosecution for 
difficult cases involving crimes of honor.
68
 They note that judges, who are males, are 
sympathetic towards the honor which has been injured by the illicit act of females while 
being unsympathetic to ‘loose’ women.69 They believe that the presence of such measures 
represented in provisions stipulating the exemption or reduction of sanctions violate 
international laws and norms and must be abolished. The codes should be globally consistent 
with international instruments such as the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women,
70
 which preserve the rights of women.
71
 
 
On the one hand, it is evident that the literature review available regarding crimes of honor in 
Egypt propose that Article 17 of the penal code is used by the Egyptian judiciary as a 
complementary article with Article 237 of the penal code. They contend that former article 
entitles judges to apply leniency to the male family members other than the husband who 
commit honor crimes. Accordingly, although the reduction under the latter article is limited 
to the husband, nevertheless, the former article if applied by the judiciary leads to a lenient 
sanction to the male family members who commit honor crimes and even for husbands who 
fail to get tried under the latter Article. While on the other hand, the literature available fails 
to provide for a considerable case analysis, however instead, they provide for very few case 
analysis involving honor crimes to which Article 17 of the Egyptian penal code is applied to. 
*** 
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Chapter II 
III. The Common Assumption on Leniency granted to Egyptian 
Courts: 
 
 
Some scholars and law practitioners believe that the Egyptian Penal code is one of the codes 
that provides a secure escape from prosecution for the perpetrators of honor crimes. They 
propose that although the honor crimes are not spelled out under Egyptian penal code, 
nonetheless, Article 17 of the penal code is often used a complementary article with Article 
237 of the same code.
72
 They argue that the latter Article provides a favorable treatment to 
husbands who kill their adulterous wives when catching them in the act of adultery.  
Moreover, they assume that the former article indirectly entrenches the scope of protection to 
cover other male relatives not only husbands although the reduction in sanction is only 
limited to husbands under the former Article.  
 
To a large extent these scholars and law practitioners who believe that Article 17 provide a 
secure escape from prosecution to the perpetrators of honor crimes who do not fall under 
Article 237 have a good point to make. Most of the literature available on honor crimes in 
Egypt base their assumption on judgments rendered in cases involving honor crimes where 
first or second instance courts give leniency to the perpetrators whether husbands or other 
male relatives like fathers, brothers or sons. However, I argue that none of these judgements 
provides a considerable analysis of judgments rendered from these courts which reflect a 
comprehensive image on the use of leniency by judges granted to them by virtue of the law. 
In light of the absence of such analysis, I believe that the assumptions they adopt is not based 
on concrete evidence that courts are always lenient towards the perpetrators of such types of 
crimes. The evidence which this literature often rely on is the narration of few judgments on 
cases of honor crimes to which the leniency of judges is applied while they disregard the 
cases to which leniency is not applied. It is because of this the literature available on honor 
crimes in Egypt should be carefully examined.  
 
This chapter provides for an analysis of the literature available on honor crimes in Egypt and 
the Middle East written in both Arabic and English. The first section of this chapter 
elucidates the ideology of both sets of literature in regards to honor crimes, while the second 
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section of the chapter analyzes the subtext of the available literature with an examination of 
what underlies both. 
 
A. English literature on honor crimes: 
 
The bulk of the literature available written in English on the issue of honor crimes in Egypt 
can be divided into firstly, literature which generally embodies an explanation for the 
favorable treatment granted to the perpetrators of honor crimes under Arab Penal codes with 
a reference to Egyptian code.
73
 Secondly, literature with a focus on the application of Article 
17 of the penal code without narration of cases involving honor crimes or analysis of those 
types of cases.
74
 Thirdly, literature with a focus on the extension of leniency by courts to the 
perpetrators of honor crimes with a brief presentation of these cases as evidence of the 
existence of such lenient treatment towards offenders of honor crimes.
75
 
 
The first group of literature presents the issue of favorable/special treatment of offenders of 
honor crimes granted generally by most of the Arab codes. This group believes that the laws 
of Arab countries, including Egypt, embody discriminatory legal provisions within their 
national legislatures. They generally refer to the discrimination found within the codes of 
these countries. Such discrimination rests in the legal provisions which provide for more 
favorable treatment of male-perpetrators of honor crimes. They believe that the latter enjoy 
biased prosecutions before courts. These legal provisions range from reduction to elimination 
of sanctions depending on each system. These scholars contend that the existence of this type 
of provision constitutes a violation of women’s rights as they grant the male-perpetrators of 
honor crimes a guaranteed escape from harsh sanctions to reduced or eliminated sanctions, 
thus helping honor crimes to continue to survive.  
 
Some literature further stress on the fact that the presence of such provisions within many of 
these Arab codes, including Egypt, supports the contention that women are dealt with as male 
properties: 
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[T]he law in many countries has implicitly treated honor as a form of 
property and has made legal and social allowances for men who seek 
to reclaim honor property through violence.
76
 
 
Being property, women are expected to preserve the honor code and ethics of the family 
within the society they live. Men are the ones responsible for monitoring and controlling 
women’s behavior within the society. Furthermore, they argue that some countries 
accommodate a comprehensible understanding of honor related crimes by reducing penalties 
for the perpetrators of honor crimes: 
 
Because the value of honor property fluctuates based on women's 
behavior, other family members, often males, seek to aggressively 
monitor and control the behavior of the women in the family. In its 
most extreme form, control over women's behavior manifests in 
honor-related violence, including murder. In some countries, the law 
perpetuates this implicit understanding of honor as property by 
reducing penalties for those who commit crimes in an effort to reclaim 
honor.
77
 
 
Others emphasize on the fact that penal codes in Egypt as well as in many Arab countries 
encompass codes which provide for reduction in sanction for the perpetrators of honor 
killings:  
 
The Jordanian, Egyptian, Syrian, and Lebanese penal codes provide 
reductions or elimination of penalty for murders committed for 
reasons of honor. The statutes generally specify that the victim is 
female, that the perpetrator is a male relative of a certain degree 
(usually brother, father, or husband), and the circumstances of the 
victim's behavior that justify the crime (catching a wife in the act of 
adultery, for example).
78
 
 
They claim that countries which designed laws as such try to balance between claims of 
cultural authenticity and claims to maintain democracy and human rights through preserving 
law. “One arm of the state seeks to preserve the law for the former purpose, while another 
seeks to change it for the latter.”79 They propose that these laws should depart from applying 
these provisions as they favor the wrong individuals; the perpetrators of honor crimes.
80
 They 
believe that these laws should be amended in order to embody more appropriate penalties 
which are consistent with the magnitude of the acts of honor killings.  
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Some further propose that these discriminative legal provisions serve as a safe escape for the 
perpetrators of honor crimes from fair prosecution carrying harsh penalties. They argue that 
these laws, in some instances, provide for full exemption of the perpetrators from such types 
of crimes.
81
 “Some countries have given these values the force of law by acquitting men who 
kill female relatives who have violated the family honor … In extreme cases, men who 
murder adulterous wives receive no punishment at all”.82 They believe that domestic laws as 
such should be amended to embody sanctions which proportionate to the gravity of the 
crimes of the honor crime committed.
83
 
 
Furthermore, some urge these countries to abolish laws which provide for the reduction or 
abolition of sanctions to be consistent with the international norms and conventions signed 
and ratified by most of these countries.
84
 They regard these laws as impeding upon the 
consistency of domestic laws with international conventions. 
 
The second group of scholars present a closer examination of the nature of the legal 
provisions embodied within Egyptian legislation as well as other Arab systems. For instance, 
they focus on the application of Article 17 of the Egyptian penal code and similar articles 
under other Arab legislative systems while the first group does not mention Article 17 per se. 
It generally shares the assumption regarding the favorable treatment granted to the 
perpetrators of honor crimes. The second group of scholars mainly focuses on how Egyptian 
competent courts, sometimes resort to the use of Article 17 as an alternative under the 
Egyptian penal code.  
 
This group refers to the favorable treatment the offenders of honor crimes – male perpetrators 
– receive on prosecution. The group claims that such favorable treatment is divided into two 
major distinctions in the way in which these codes regulate honor crimes. The first codes 
limit honor crimes to situations of adultery and provide for a reduction in sanction and not an 
exemption from sanction: 
 
[S]ome Codes (Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, and Kuwait) limit the defense 
to situations of adultery, and they provide for a reduction of, not 
exemption from, punishment. Other Codes expand the defense to 
situations of the "un-lawful bed" (Jordan) or "attitude equivoque" 
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(Syria, Lebanon) which receive a reduced sentence, while limiting the 
excuse of exemption to cases of adultery.
85
 
 
Other codes may vary in terms of who benefits from such reduction or elimination of 
sanction.
86
 Codes may expand the range of the beneficiaries of the excuse to include, not only 
the husbands but also, female unlawful males – ones who cannot marry women for nursing, 
blood or marriage reasons: 
 
The Syrian and Lebanese Codes adopt the French terminology (wife, 
female ascendants, descendants and sister) so that the husband, the 
son, the father and the brother benefit. The Jordanian Code grants 
these relatives a reduced sentence in the case of the unlawful bed, 
while providing exemption for a bigger list of beneficiaries through its 
use of the Ottoman expression, wife or female un-lawfuls in the case 
of "committing adultery.
87
 
 
As noted Egypt falls within the range of the first distinction along with the codes of Libya, 
Kuwait and Tunisia provide favorable treatment to offenders of honor crimes for reasons of 
adultery. They do so by providing for a reduction in sanction and not an elimination of 
sanction. 
 
Other codes like the Jordanian penal code provide full elimination of the sanction for 
husbands who kill their wives for committing adultery. Article 340 of the Jordanian Penal 
Code provides for the following: “He who catches his wife, or one of his female un-lawfuls 
committing adultery with another, and he kills, wounds, or injures one or both of them, is 
excused and benefits from an exemption from penalty.” 88 
 
The second distinction relates to who benefits from the reduction or the elimination of the 
sanction. The Egyptian code limits the benefit from its reduction in sanction to the husband 
while no other male relatives can benefit from such a reduction. Only husbands who kill, 
wound or injure their wives committing adultery benefit from a reduction in sanction.
89
 
According to the Egyptian penal code, husbands who kill their wives on the spot while 
committing adultery are sanctioned for committing a misdemeanor and not a felony. Article 
237 of the Egyptian Penal Code stipulates the following: 
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“Whoever surprises his wife in the act of adultery and kills her on the spot together with her 
adulterer-partner shall be punished with prison [habs] instead of the penalties prescribed in 
Articles 234 and 236.” 
 
Under the Jordanian code the beneficiaries from the elimination of sanction extends beyond 
the husband to include all female-unlawful males as paternal male relatives, even the 
female’s brother in law may benefit from the elimination of sanction if the conditions 
stipulated within the law are met: “He who catches his wife, or one of his female ascendants 
or descendants or sisters with another in an un-lawful bed, and he kills or wounds or injures 
one or both of them, benefits from a reduction of penalty.” 90 
 
Arab codes either explicitly stipulate a reduction or elimination of sanction for the 
perpetrators of such crimes, or embrace special legal provisions which empowers judges to 
extend the use of their leniency to perpetrators of such type crimes.
91
 The Egyptian penal 
code under Article 237, though, limits explicitly the reduction in sanction to husbands killing 
their wives committing adultery. This group contends that the Egyptian judiciary often resorts 
to other available legal provisions in order to extend the application of their leniency to other 
males other than the husband.  
 
A remarkable effort to highlight is in this creative use of the law by Lama Abu-Odeh’s 
work.
92
 Generally, Lama Abu-Odeh proposes that the Arab judiciary usually resort to 
alternative available concepts circumventing, in instances like honor crimes, the will of the 
legislator.
 93
 More specifically, she states that judiciaries adopting such codes usually resort to 
the application of alternative concepts to ensure the extension of the beneficiaries of the 
excuse. Such alternative concepts are represented in the application of leniency granted to the 
judiciary by virtue of law to which they commonly resort upon examining cases involving 
honor crimes. She gives for the Jordanian and the Egyptian judiciary as examples. In Jordan 
this can be seen in Article 98 of the penal code which stipulates the following: “He who 
commits a crime in a fit of fury caused by an un-rightful and dangerous act on the part of the 
victim, benefits from a reduction of penalty.”94 
She and several others especially among the third group note that leniency endowed to the 
judiciary by Article 17 of the Egyptian penal code stand as the alternative available concept 
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by which judiciary applies leniency at their own discretion to a massive number of felonies in 
general and to a wide range of male perpetrators of honor crimes. Article 17 of the penal code 
stipulates that:  
In felony counts [Jinayat], if the conditions of the crime for which the 
popular action is brought necessitate the judge's lenity, the penalty 
may be changed as follows:  
Capital punishment penalty may be replaced by a life hard labor or 
temporary hard labor penalty. 
A permanent hard labor penalty may be replaced by a temporary hard 
labor penalty or by imprisonment.  
A temporary hard labor penalty may be replaced by imprisonment or 
confinement penalty that may not be less than six months.  
An imprisonment sentence may be replaced by confinement penalty 
which may not be less than three months.
95
 
 
They argue that the reduction in sanction under Article 237 of the penal code is limited to the 
husband. However, nothing impairs the discretionary power of courts examining the subject 
matter to exercise leniency entitled to them by virtue of Article 17 of the penal code to other 
paternal male relatives like fathers, brothers and sons. Abu-Odeh contends that the 
application of leniency rests at the sole discretion of the Egyptian judiciary, forming a sort of 
extension to the protection male perpetrators of such type of crimes generally enjoy.
96
 
 
She notes that the Arab legislation ranges between two ends: honor crimes on the one end and 
passion crimes on the other. She believes that since Egypt limits the reduction in sanctions 
stipulated under Article 237 to husbands, it should be close to the passion crimes end. 
However, in light of the discretionary power the Egyptian judiciary enjoys in applying 
leniency to felonies, other male relatives other than the husband may be granted a reduction 
in sanction thus placing Egypt midway between the two ends of passion and honor.
97
  
 
This group of scholars stress that in light of Article 17 not only paternal male relatives who 
commit such type of crimes benefit from a sanction reduction but also husbands who fail to 
meet the conditions set forth under Article 237 of the penal code. For instance, Abu-Odeh 
believes that the use by judges of this article for crimes of honor serves as a message to 
society. She states that judges by applying this article to offenders involved in such type of 
crimes implicitly reintroduce a message to society that some sexual practices are not tolerated 
by courts.
98
 She contends that judges are often lenient to the perpetrators of such type of 
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crimes as they do not accept the existence of illegitimate sexual affairs among the 
surrounding society. And she refers to the high stakes a society bears in light of the existence 
of such articles within Arab legislation:
99
 “The judges consciously [reject] the reinstitution of 
traditional society but they [send] cultural messages that subversive sexual practices [are] not 
to be tolerated.”100 
 
This group of scholars who gives no detailed narration or analysis to cases to which Article 
17 has been applied. Abu-Odeh acknowledges that it would always be hard to test the 
tendency of Egyptian judiciary in regards to the application of leniency as the rulings of 
lower courts remain unpublished.
101
 She believes that a case analysis would be hard to build 
in light of such difficulty. 
 
The third group also refer to the application of courts to Article 17 of the Egyptian penal code 
as the second group of scholars do. However, they go a bit further as they provide a few cases 
where courts applied Article 17 to the perpetrators of honor crimes. It refers to such cases as 
evidence of the use by courts of leniency towards male offenders committing this type of 
crime. Such literature is limited.
102
 The authors in this group claim that courts apply leniency 
endowed to them by virtue of Article 17 of the penal code to the perpetrators of this crime 
with no higher supervision from higher courts such as the court of cassation:  
 
The issue of extenuating circumstances is one that is left totally to the 
discretion of the court of fact, and it is up to this court to take it into 
account for the benefit of the accused even if he didn’t plead for it … 
and the Court of Cassation has no jurisdiction over the matter so that 
an appeal for considering the extenuating circumstances cannot be a 
cause for action before the Court of Cassation.
103
 
 
They argue that the courts of first or second instance tend to use the discretionary power 
endowed to them by virtue of Article 17 in applying leniency to the paternal relatives accused 
of committing honor crimes. They argue that Article 17 with its wide range of discretionary 
power granted to the competent courts provide the perpetrators of such types of crimes 
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lenient treatment which they believe that it should not be imposed upon the perpetrators of 
these crimes.  
 
This group believes that though honor crimes are not spelled out explicitly in the Egyptian 
penal code, however, they claim that courts commonly use Article 17 to waive or reduce 
sanctions against male offenders who commit crimes involving honor:
104
  “[honor] killings 
that cannot be accommodated within the strict sphere of application of Article 237 are being 
relegated to the discretion of the lower courts of fact as cases requiring the sympathy of the 
judge under Article 17”.105 
 
The reduction in sanction under Article 237 is limited to husbands and no other male 
relatives. And Article 17 grants wide discretionary power to the competent courts to apply 
leniency on the perpetrators of felonies. Thus, they consider Article 17 of the code as it stands 
as forming a sort of protection to other paternal relatives like fathers, brothers or sons who 
perpetrate an honor crime.  
 
The supporters of this opinion believe that the Egyptian penal code is gender biased.
106
 They 
claim that according to the cases they have examined, it is obvious that courts are biased 
towards male perpetrators. They believe that the Egyptian penal code includes gender biased 
articles which favor male perpetrators of such crimes. One in particular, is Article 17 of the 
Egyptian penal code which, at the will of judges, extends favorable treatment to male 
offenders who commit honor crimes and allow them to benefit from a reduction in sanction 
almost on the same footing as the husbands do under Article 237. 
 
This group argues that some of that judges of legal systems embracing reductions or 
elimination of sanctions believe that perpetrators of honor crimes are not criminals in the eye 
of the judiciary.
107
 They believe that offenders of honor crimes were socially compelled to 
commit their crimes. They claim that judges always take into consideration the pressure that 
society exerts upon the perpetrators of such type of crimes. Honor killings within the 
societies embracing articles providing reduction and exemption from sanctions are believed 
to serve as a means of cleansing for the stained honor. Males, as the guardians of the family’s 
honor, must make sure that female family members are abiding by the code of honor adopted 
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within the society. Reducing or elimination sanctions allows a re-establishment of the 
wronged family’s honor. 
 
B. Arabic literature written on honor crimes: 
 
The published Egyptian literature written in Arabic discussing the issue of implementation of 
article 17 to crimes involving honor and to the perpetrators of such type of crimes is rare to 
find. Of that which exists, the literature can be divided into three main groups. The first group 
generally elucidates the legal provisions of the Egyptian penal code. They make no 
connection between honor crimes and the leniency endowed to the judiciary under Article 17 
of the penal code.
108
 The second group also explains legal provisions of the Egyptian penal 
code. It differs from the first group in that it further refers, within the general context, to the 
possibility of the judiciary applying leniency to the perpetrators of honor crimes where they 
seem appropriate.
109
 The last group goes further than the other two groups by expressing their 
own views on the rationale behind the limitation of reduction of penalty to the husband 
stipulated under Article 237 of the penal code.
110
 
 
The first group explains the legal provisions of the penal code, presenting all the rationale 
behind each article. For instance they elucidate the limitation stipulated under Article 237 of 
the penal code to the husband rather than any male relative. This group also explains the 
conditions and limitations of the implementation of Article 17 of the penal code which is 
examined closely in the upcoming chapter. They do not state any personal views regarding 
these two legal provisions.  
 
As for the second group of scholars, it goes one step further than the first group. It refers to 
the fact that the judiciary may resort, under some instances, to the application of Article 17 of 
the penal code to some of the honor crimes.  
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The last group includes the views of some Egyptian legal scholars from Cairo University.
111
 
They explicitly state that limiting the application of Article 237 of the Egyptian Penal Code 
to men rather than women and the deprivation of the latter from the reduction stipulated 
under Article 237 of the penal code should be considered as fair discrimination.
112
 They see 
that although the adultery of the husband is equal to the adultery of the wife from the moral 
perspective, the adultery of the latter is deemed more dangerous than the former’s from the 
social perspective as it may lead to more serious consequences than the adultery of the 
husband like the confusion of lineages.
113
 While others relate such discrimination to the 
assumption that the wife, being the nucleus of the family,114 should be the guardian of her 
husband’s honor “Ird” and such crime would not take place unless the wife completely 
surrenders her husband and children to her accomplice in adultery.
115
 They believe that the 
female members involved in adultery situations results in social immorality. 
 
C. Alternative analysis: 
 
Unlike the literature available in English on honor crimes, most of the Egyptian literature 
written in Arabic does not recognize the existence of Articles 17 and 237 of the penal code as 
being problematic. This is based on the following reasons. First, in regards to Article 237 of 
the penal code, they believe that a husband who kills his wife immediately upon surprising 
her committing adultery is not a dangerous person in the first place. They believe that a 
husband who commit this act – killing the wife – is result of provocation.116 They see the 
perpetrator, in such instance, as not reflecting a high level of criminality. Second, in regards 
to the implementation of Article 17 of the penal code, they often see that this assumption is 
originally based on the inherent right of the judiciary. It sees appropriate for any felony to 
resort to the application of general provisions stipulated in the penal code and Article 17 of 
the penal code stands as such.
117
  
 
The literature written in English on honor crimes shares a general assumption that the 
presence of legal provisions embodied generally within Arab legislation and specifically 
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within the Egyptian legislation as Articles 17 and 237 of the Egyptian penal code clearly 
provide for the safe prosecutions of the perpetrators of honor crimes.  
 
They claim that judges by virtue of the power endowed to them under Article 17 circumvent 
the will of the legislator stipulated under Article 237 of the penal code. The legislator, in the 
latter article, has limited the reduction of sanctions to husbands killing their wives for 
committing adultery. It is believed that judges usually use the former article, as an alternative 
concept available under the same code, to entrench the scope of the favorable treatment to 
other male relatives. Furthermore, judges may, on their own, give leniency to husbands who 
fail to meet the conditions stipulated under the Article 237 of the penal code. They argue that 
such discretionary power constitutes a major obstacle towards the erosion of honor crimes in 
Egypt. They claim that Article 17 of the penal code acts as a complementary article to Article 
237 of the penal code. With the wide discretionary power it puts at the sole discretion of the 
judges, it enables the latter to give leniency wherever they deem necessary. They claim that 
judges favor honor crime perpetrators as they widely give leniency to honor crimes. In 
looking at the published literature in both Arabic and English, I believe that none of the 
literature available on honor crimes critically analyzes actual rulings on cases involving 
honor crimes which may stand as concrete evidence of their claim. The published literature 
found citing cases involving honor crimes are very few. Moreover, they did not analyze wide 
range of cases out of which one may assume the tendency of the judges, in regards of giving 
leniency to perpetrators of honor crimes.   
 
The English literature can be divided into two main streams; the first believes that it is hard to 
provide for a proper honor crimes case analysis, especially in light of the non-availability of 
court rulings due to the non-publication of these rulings. While the second often disregard 
that problem and directly assume that the leniency of judges always provides a secure escape 
for the perpetrators of honor crimes under Article 17 of the Egyptian penal code. Both 
streams carry the same assumption: that the discretionary power awarded to judges is 
wrongfully used in favor of perpetrators of honor crimes, whether for husbands who fail to 
fall under the application of Article 237 of the Egyptian penal code or for the paternal 
relatives who often perpetrate honor crimes for the sake of preserving honor. 
 
I, nevertheless, argue that there exists an alternative type of analysis which the available 
literature fails to provide. Such analysis presupposes an alternative view of the application of 
leniency by courts in honor related crimes. An analysis of the appeals reviewed and 
submitted before the Egyptian Court of Cassation relating to the application of Article 17 of 
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the penal code out of which one may assume whether does the judiciary adopt a specific 
tendency of giving leniency to the perpetrators of honor crimes or not. 
 
Such analysis illuminates the practice of judges in relation to the application of leniency. It 
reflects to a considerable extent how in practice judges apply their leniency in terms of what 
type of crimes leniency is most often employed, what type of perpetrators benefit the most 
from the leniency, and whether judges do, in fact, give leniency to the perpetrators of honor 
crimes or not.  
 
Before presenting the analysis, the next chapter provides a brief background on the 
conditions, regulations and the scope of application of Article 17 as stipulated in the Egyptian 
penal code. Furthermore, an explanation of the authority of the Egyptian Court of Cassation 
over the use of leniency by lower courts is explained for the sake of the later analysis. 
 
 
*** 
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Chapter III 
IV. The Concept of Leniency under Egyptian Penal Code: definition, 
regulation and scope of application 
 
Scholars argue that from the power endowed to them by virtue of Article 17 of the penal code 
they often lean towards giving leniency to the perpetrators of honor crimes. Thus they 
descend with the penalty stipulated for murder to less harsh penalties. For the sake of the 
counter argument this paper provides for an explanation of the nature of the discretionary 
power stipulated in the Egyptian penal code has to be elucidated. The legislator is the one 
responsible for setting the conditions, regulations and the scope of application of legal 
provisions as stipulated under any legal corpus. This chapter provides a brief explanation of 
the classification of crimes under the Egyptian penal code. Furthermore, it elucidates the 
concept of leniency adopted under Article 17 of the Egyptian penal code, its scope of 
application and regulation. And finally the authority of the court of cassation upon the 
application of Article 17 of the penal code is discussed.  
 
A. Classification of crimes under Egyptian penal code: 
 
Crimes are classified as per Article 9 of the Egyptian penal code into three types: felonies, 
misdemeanors and contraventions. The classification of crimes is based on the harshness of 
punishment according to the magnitude of the act committed. Accordingly, felonies are 
crimes punished by life execution, life imprisonment, aggravated imprisonment and 
imprisonment.
118
 And misdemeanors are crimes punished by detention of no less than twenty 
four hours and no more than three years and/or fines exceeding one hundred Egyptian 
pounds.
119
 Contraventions are acts punished by fines less than one hundred Egyptian 
pounds.
120
 
 
B. The nature of leniency granted to the Egyptian judiciary: 
 
                                                 
118
 Law No. 58 of 1937 (Criminal Code of 1937, reformed in 1952), Al-Waqi’a al-Misriyah 5 Aug. 1937, Article 
10 (Egypt). 
119
 Law No. 58 of 1937 (Criminal Code of 1937, reformed in 1952), Al-Waqi’a al-Misriyah 5 Aug. 1937, Article 
11 (Egypt). 
120
 Law No. 58 of 1937 (Criminal Code of 1937, reformed in 1952), Al-Waqi’a al-Misriyah 5 Aug. 1937, Article 
12 (Egypt). 
29 
 
The Egyptian penal code recognizes the concept of leniency in criminal matters. Article 17 of 
the Egyptian penal code grants courts wide discretionary power in regards to criminal matters 
brought before them. Courts are allowed to use leniency when they believe necessary based 
on the circumstances of the crime examined. Such leniency granted to judges by virtue of that 
article empowers them to reduce penalties stipulated for felonies. The reduction of penalty is 
done through the replacement of the penalty stipulated for felonies by another more lenient 
penalty. The judge may replace the penalty stipulated with a more lenient punishment on the 
condition that the penalty replaced is no lower than one or two instances in punishment. 
 
C. Regulations and Scope of application:  
 
The application of Article 17 of the penal code is not absolute. It is regulated in the manner 
stipulated by the law. The conditions set for the application of Article 17 of the penal code 
are that it applies: 
 
a. To felonies;  
b. Within the limits stipulated by law; 
c. At the discretion of the judge.121 
 
One of the general rules pertaining to the application of Article 17 of the Egyptian penal code 
is that it is limited to felonies.
122
 It cannot be applied to misdemeanors and contraventions as 
in light of the minimum punishments stipulated for them under the law there would be no 
space to apply Article 17.  
 
The application of Article 17 of the penal code on felonies is not absolute. It cannot be 
applied to all felonies. This is due to the fact that some law provisions may stipulate the ban 
or limit the application of that Article. The legislator has introduced some special legal 
provisions which the general rules adopted within the penal codes cannot be applied to. 
Accordingly the application of Article 17 as a general rule under the penal code should be 
regarded in light of these special provisions. These special legal provisions are exceptional 
provisions to which Article 17 as a general rule do not apply. The non-application of Article 
17 can be wholly or partially. A public official who seeks or communicates with a foreign 
country in a way that bounds to prejudice Egypt's warlike, diplomatic, political, or economic 
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situation is deprived by virtue of law from the application of leniency in Article 17 of the 
penal code.
123
 Special laws, as the law on combating drugs trafficking, may limit the 
application of Article 17 of the penal code. Some articles of the code in combating drugs 
trafficking stipulates that the courts may give their leniency to the perpetrators of the crimes, 
however, they may not lessen their sanctions to less than six years of imprisonment.
124
 
 
The second condition is that the application of article 17 of the penal code has to be within 
the limit stipulated under the law. The legislator has conditioned the application of leniency 
of judges within a certain range. Such range is framed by the law in granting the power to 
judges to lessen the penalty stipulated for a certain felony one or two instances down. 
According to the Article 17 of the penal code, the judges may replace a harsh felony penalty 
with another more lenient penalty; in doing so, judges are obliged to stick to the range 
stipulated under Article 17. Accordingly, judges, when they believe necessary, are entitled to 
replace the penalty of execution with one instance less penalty like life imprisonment, or two 
instances less penalty like temporal aggravated imprisonment.  
 
The third condition is for the implementation of leniency which lies at the complete 
discretion of judges. In terms of the reduction of sanctions, the legislator differentiates 
between legal excuses and lenient judicial circumstances. The first, as in the case of an 
adolescent accused under the age of 18, is named exclusively under the law, however, the 
second, as in a case where the accused has exceeded the age of 18,
125
 are left to the discretion 
of the judge to decide what circumstances he considers as lenient judicial circumstances. 
Accordingly, judges may not use analogy or exceed the legal excuses stipulated under the 
law. Reduction of sanction, where stipulated, is placed on a judge to abide by and apply to the 
case at hand.
126
  
 
Unlike lenient judicial circumstances, judges at their discretion may reduce penalties. It is 
believed that the legislator left lenient judicial circumstances without stipulation, as in legal 
excuses, so judges apply leniency where they see necessary in all cases brought before them, 
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especially unusual cases.
127
 It should be noted that legal excuses may change the nature of the 
crime or the act committed according to the penalty applied; if detention is the penalty 
applied thus it would be considered as misdemeanor and not felony. Nevertheless, when 
lenient judicial treatment is applied, the nature of the crime is not changed according to the 
penalty applied. Thus the crime would be still classified as a felony even though the penalty 
applied is within the scope of penalties stipulated for misdemeanors.
128
 
 
D. Additional conditions for the application of leniency: 
 
Additional conditions for the application of a court’s leniency rests in the circumstances 
related to the criminal him/herself. These condition are believed to be obvious conditions. 
The first condition relates to the criminal record of the criminal. A criminal who deserves the 
court’s leniency, from the point of view of the latter, has to be clean in terms of his criminal 
record. A criminal whose criminal record reflects a criminal tendency should not benefit from 
the leniency of judges. The competent court, when deciding on a case, needs to check the 
criminal record of the perpetrator. If the latter’s criminal record reflects the commission of 
other felonies of the same nature or magnitude. Thus, leniency should not be applied. A 
criminal with a criminal record reflecting a serious criminal tendency should not benefit from 
leniency. The logic is based on the fact that criminals with clean criminal records who 
perpetrate a crime under the conditions judges deem entailing their leniency are assumed to 
have perpetrated their crime with the contribution of such conditions, thus they apply their 
leniency to this type of criminal with the hope that they may achieve the utmost purpose of 
the legislator who seeks the punishment of perpetrators for the criminal act besides realizing 
the policy of correction and reform. The policy implies punishing criminals for their criminal 
act while at the same time aiming at the correction and the rehabilitation of such criminal.  
 
Another condition which is classified under the judicial circumstances is provocation. The 
Egyptian code does not recognize provocation as an exemption or an excuse which entails the 
implementation of court’s leniency except in the case of a husband who surprises his wife 
committing adultery with another stipulated under Article 237 of the penal code. 
Nevertheless, provocation in some instances may be deemed as a factor for the reduction of 
sanction. The competent court on their own may consider provocation as a lenient judicial 
circumstance to which their leniency can be exercised. 
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E. Authority of the Egyptian Court of Cassation: 
Authority of the Egyptian Court of Cassation on the implementation of Article 17 of the 
Egyptian penal code is limited. The rationale for that is based on several factors. The main 
factors relates to the nature of function of the court of cassation. The legislative formula of 
Article 17 of the penal code, per se, gives discretion to the competent court to apply leniency 
when they see necessary. The first factor relates to the function of the court of cassation. The 
Egyptian Criminal Procedures Code organizing the functions of the court of cassation under 
Article 30 stipulates the following: 
 
“Public prosecution, defendant or the responsible for the civil rights 
have the right to appeal the final ruling in a felony or a misdemeanor 
rendered before the court of cassation in the following instances: 
1. If the appealed ruling is based on contravention or 
misapplication or interpretation of law, 
2. If an annulment hits the ruling, 
3. If any of the procedures were wrongfully carried affecting the 
ruling.”129 
 
According to the law, the functions of the court of cassation is limited to these stipulated 
within the law of criminal procedures. Technically the court of cassation reviews the 
application of laws ensuring that the laws and the procedures have been implemented in the 
correct manner. In all cases, a court may not exceed or bypass these functions. One of the 
direct consequences in relation to the application of Article 17 of the penal code, is that a plea 
to apply the leniency of the judge cannot be brought, the first time, before the court of 
cassation. Accordingly, the acceptance, by the court of cassation, to an appeal demanding for 
the first time the application of Article 17 of the penal code exceeds the scope of functions 
entitled to the court.
130
 Such a plea may be only submitted for the first time before the court 
competent in examining the subject matter. 
 
The second factor relates to the legislation empowering judges to use leniency when they see 
necessary. The legislation formula under which Article 17 exists under the Egyptian penal 
code forms a semi-umbrella which encompasses wide discretionary power granted at the 
hand of the judge examining the subject matter. Such wide discretionary power can be tested 
in several manners. One is that the circumstances of the crime is left to judges examining the 
subject matter of the case in order to evaluate whether such circumstances entail the 
implementation of their leniency or not. Being the competent court, it can freely decide what 
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to consider as lenient judicial circumstances without being obliged to state in their reasoning 
the nature of these circumstances or their influence on the crime or the act committed.  
 
For instance, practically speaking, judges are not required to record in the court reasoning the 
exact circumstances upon which they have based their leniency upon. The court of cassation 
in its rulings recognizes that the reason behind the lenient judicial circumstances is left to the 
internal feeling of the judge which cannot be explicitly expressed in his ruling reasoning 
unlike other legal issues.
131
 A judge deciding on any felony, while rendering his judgment, is 
not committed to listing all the circumstances he has relied on or what he sees as entailing the 
application of his leniency. Thus he is not obliged to state in the court’s reasoning that he has 
taken into consideration the difficult life and the abject poverty which a perpetrator may have 
been suffering from by the time of committing his crime or even to state his belief that if such 
circumstances were not present the latter would have not committed his crime, and that the 
perpetrator has committed his crime out of dire need and poverty.  
 
The issue of what the judge can consider as lenient judicial circumstances to which he applies 
leniency reflects a very wide discretionary power. The court of cassation ruled that such 
lenient judicial circumstances are not limited to the circumstances of the accused but also 
includes the circumstances of the entire criminal incident encompassing all the factors related 
to the rationale of the criminal act, the circumstances of the victim as well as the 
perpetrator.
132
 This widens the scope of choice for judges to consider whatever circumstances 
they see necessary to exercise their leniency. 
 
Another which is closely related to the non-obligation of judges to state the circumstances 
they relied upon while applying their leniency is that they only need to point out in their 
reasoning that they applied Article 17 of the penal code. But once a judge has pointed out the 
application of judgment he is compelled to lessen the verdict one or two instances in the 
manner prescribed under the law. Accordingly, a judge who states in his reasoning that 
leniency is applied but renders his judgment with the minimum penalty already stipulated for 
the felony at hand, subjects his judgment to the court of cassation’s refutation on the basis of 
misapplication of law. An example of misapplication of law is when a judge applies leniency 
to a felony, and renders his verdict within the range of the minimum penalty stipulated for 
such felony in the penal code.
133
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Moreover, a judge who fails to state within his reasoning that he applied leniency to the case 
at hand, though it can be assumed from the nature of the penalty rendered that leniency was 
exercised, it would not be considered as misapplication of law by the court of cassation. 
Multiple rulings of the latter stress that in case the competent court while rendering its 
judgment, did not point out that it applied its leniency to the case at hand, and it is apparent 
from the ruling that leniency was being implemented should not be grounds for an appeal 
before the court of cassation. The decisive element in this case would be whether the 
competent court rendered its reduced penalty within the limits stipulated under Article 17 of 
the penal code or not. Therefore, a ruling as such would not be considered to be 
misapplication of the law as long as it is rendered within the range of leniency stipulated 
under the penal code.
134
 
 
Added to the wide discretionary power of judges, in the case of multi-perpetrators, judges can 
choose to apply their leniency to one or more of the perpetrators while depriving the others 
from such leniency. Limiting the application of leniency to one accused among several others 
is at the judge’s discretion. The reason for this is that circumstances differ from one crime to 
another as well as from one accused to another. The status and circumstances of the 
perpetrators are not the same and the judge is free to decide under which circumstances 
leniency would be exercised and which not.
135
 Thus, the circumstances of one accused may 
qualify for leniency in the judge’s opinion while the circumstances of the other accused do 
not. Accordingly the former would benefit from the judge’s leniency while the latter is denied 
such leniency. 
 
It is obvious that the competent court enjoys wide discretionary power in regards to the 
application of leniency to felonies. The court at its will, is free to apply leniency to whatever 
felonies they consider appropriate and whomever committed such a criminal act. The main 
constraint on such will is that the former has to abide within the range of punishments 
stipulated under the law. Otherwise it is subject to the review of the court of cassation who 
would refute the judgment based on the misapplication of law. 
 
*** 
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Chapter IV 
V. Examination of the appeals submitted before the court of cassation 
involving the application of leniency 
 
The literature available on the crimes of honor, as shown, assumes that the judiciary in Egypt 
often adopts a certain tendency towards honor crimes forming a sort of protection from 
prosecution for the perpetrators of honor crimes. The safe escape it provides lies in the 
resorting of the judiciary to leniency. They believe that the judicial rulings usually resort to 
leniency on cases of honor crimes for the perpetrators of the crime. This often takes place 
when the perpetrators of the crimes are the victim’s paternal relatives. Furthermore leniency 
may extend to perpetrators who do not fall within the prescribed reduction in sanction granted 
under Article 237 of the penal code. If a husband fails to meet the conditions stipulated under 
the latter article, the judiciary can still sentence him to a more lenient verdict. Lenient 
sanctions mount to the same level sanction adopted under Article 237 of the penal code. 
 
The literature suggests that leniency of the judiciary towards the perpetrators of honor crimes 
is widely used. Scholars believe that whenever a crime of honor is brought before the 
judiciary, the latter often applies leniency empowered to them by virtue of law. As explained 
in chapter two, the bulk of the literature on honor crimes written in English share this 
common assumption. The literature available ranges from admitting the difficulty of 
providing an analysis due to the non-publication or non-availability of such cases at one end 
to directly assuming that the leniency of judges provides a secure escape for the perpetrators 
of honor crimes on the other end. Both points of views do not provide concrete analysis. They 
mainly base their assumption on prior analysis of very few cases involving honor with a 
direct focus to the use of leniency of judges in these cases. None of which give a wider focus 
to the application of Article 17 of the penal code in general. The analysis this chapter 
attempts to reflect a considerable extent in regards to the crimes that Egyptian judiciary tend 
to apply leniency upon including honor crimes. 
 
Some scholars acknowledge the problematic issue that the rulings of Egyptian courts 
deciding on the subject matter remain unpublished.
136
 They continue to base their assumption 
on the analysis of very few case rulings involving honor and develop their common 
assumption and directly assume that the perpetrators of such type of crimes are granted an 
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escape from the punishment which suits the severity of the crimes they commit. An attempt 
which this chapter tends to overcome is the problem of unpublished court rulings rendered 
from the courts deciding on the subject matter through an analysis of the appeals submitted 
before the court of cassation involving the application of Article 17 of the penal code. In 
contrary to the court rulings of the courts deciding on the subject matter, the appeals 
submitted before the Egyptian Court of Cassation are often published and further used as 
reference by legal scholars and practitioners. This paper acknowledges the fact that the 
analysis of appeals submitted before the court of cassation are provisional, drawn from a 
small number of appeals and does not provide a conclusive image for how Egyptian judiciary 
treats honor crimes. However, one must not undermine the outcome of the analysis of these 
appeals. Although the outcome of such analysis is provisional, nonetheless, it reflects to a 
considerable extent of the realities of trial court practices by highlighting courts’ reasoning on 
the cases appealed and involve the application of Article 17 of the penal code.  
 
Accordingly, this chapter analyzes the actual appeals submitted before the Egyptian Court of 
Cassation relating to the application of Article 17 of the penal code. The analysis, this chapter 
presents, reveals to a considerable extent the way judges apply leniency to the crimes they are 
ruling on. It reflects, in practice, how and when judges apply their leniency, what types of 
crimes leniency is most applied to, what type of perpetrators benefit the most from the 
leniency and whether judges necessarily apply their leniency to the perpetrators of honor 
crimes at all.  
 
The study provides an approximate view on which crimes the judiciary seems to be most 
lenient towards. The need of framing such a picture is that most of the literature available 
assumes the frequent leniency of judiciary towards the perpetrators of crimes involving 
honor. It is obvious that the literature available on honor crimes as discussed previously in 
details share the common ideology about the leniency empowered to the judiciary that 
whenever crimes of honor are brought before the judiciary, the latter rules leniently to the 
perpetrators of such type of crimes securing them an escape from the adequate punishment. 
The literature available assumes the presence of a certain tendency of the judiciary to apply 
their leniency to the perpetrators of crimes of honor. 
 
This study is based on the compilation of number of appeals collected which were submitted 
before the Egyptian Court of Cassation that dates from 1934 till 2014. The study examines 
the court rulings relating to the application of Article 17 of the penal code that were reviewed 
before the Egyptian Court of Cassation. The rulings examined under the study are the rulings 
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from judicial year 4, 1934 to the judicial year 83, 2014. The examination deals with all the 
cases in relation to the application of Article 17 which were submitted before the court of 
cassation during that time. The rulings encompassed a wide range of crimes. The crimes 
differed in nature, type and magnitude. They range among crimes relating to state, 
individuals, public health, public officials and others.   
 
An analysis based on the suggested study will focus on the appeals brought before the court 
of cassation and involving the application of Article 17 of the penal code. From the 
examination of such appeals, a statistical inference can be deduced by which one may draw a 
considerable image to the realities of court trials and how judges tend to apply their leniency 
to perpetrators of crimes. The analysis shows that there is a wide application of leniency 
made by the Egyptian judiciary to various crimes brought before them. The first part of this 
chapter presents the statistics regarding to the appeals submitted by the court of cassation 
involving the application of leniency. The second part of the chapter takes a closer look at 
cases involving honor to Article 17 of the penal code was whether invoked or applied. 
 
Conclusion drawn from the rulings examined during these years show that honor crimes are 
not decisively the most common crimes to which the leniency of the judiciary is applied. The 
study compiles a huge number of crimes to which Article 17 is applied or has been invoked 
and which were later appealed before the court of cassation. The classification of crimes is 
based on the type of the wrongful act committed whether a misdemeanor or a felony. The 
study classified crimes as ones relating to the state, occurring to individuals, 
occurring/relating to the public officials, crimes relating to public wealth and other 
miscellaneous crimes.  
 
A. Statistical inference: 
 
The table below reflects the outcome of the study on the crimes which were appealed under 
or involving the application of Article 17 of the penal code before the court of cassation. 
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Table 1: statistics of the appeals examined: 
 
Crime Number 
Crimes relating to State 
Drugs  414 
Forgery 152 
Illegal possession of weapons 54 
Forgery and merchandizing of currency 12 
Trafficking of monuments 4 
Joining a terrorist group 4 
Damaging Communication lines 2 
Building without a license 1 
Voluntary waste of official documents 1 
Importing waste products 1 
Total 645 
Crimes occurring to individuals 
Murder 256 
Battery leading to permanent disability 79 
Theft/robbery 62 
Sexual laceration 48 
Attempted Murder 39 
Battery leading to death 34 
Kidnapping 21 
Honor Killings 9 
Arson 10 
Coerced signature 5 
Attempted rape [statutory rape] 4 
Coerced Abortion 4 
Involuntary killing 1 
Total 572 
Crimes on Public Wealth 
Embezzlement  110 
Bribery 106 
Seizure of state money 59 
Tax evasion 16 
voluntary undermining of state funds 5 
Unjust earning 4 
Breach of contract to which a state is a party 4 
Transgression on state property 3 
Illicit gain 2 
Total 309 
Crimes occurring/relating to Public Officials 
Assaulting a public official 11 
Torturing inmates 5 
Arbitrary Arrest 4 
Resisting authorities 1 
Total 21 
Others 
Slaughtering female stock 2 
Cheque without provision cover 1 
Slaughtering outside slaughter house 1 
39 
 
Total 4 
Sub Total 1551 
 
 
The above statistics on the appeals examined which were appealed under or involving the 
application of Article 17 before the court of cassation, during the specified time, show that 
leniency of judiciary is widely applied. Such leniency is applied to various type of crimes. 
Crimes varied between crimes occurring to State, public officials, individuals, public wealth 
and other miscellaneous crimes as classified under the table above. 
 
Crimes occurring to state, the examined rulings before the court of cassation shows that drugs 
related crimes are the most common crimes to which Article 17 is applied. Drugs related 
crimes vary between the illicit possession, smuggling and addiction of drugs. The judiciary 
seems to be lenient towards such type of crimes according to that study. Following drugs, 
forgery and illegal possession of weapons are also treated in a lenient manner. The leniency 
of judiciary is also applied widely to include crimes related to forgery, illegal possession of 
weapons, forgery and merchandizing of currency, trafficking of monuments, etc. These 
crimes seem to take part of the judiciary’s leniency as well at the latter’s discretion. 
 
Crimes occurring to individuals come in the second place in the lenient treatment of judiciary 
following crimes to the state. Competent courts often resort to the application of leniency to 
crimes occurring to individuals. Murder crimes come on top of the crimes occurring to 
individuals which leniency applies to. Article 17 of the penal code is widely applied to 
murder crimes by the competent courts. The high number of murder crimes to which leniency 
is applied may reflect a general tendency by the judiciary to be lenient to murder crimes as 
with any other crime.  
 
In applying their leniency to murder crimes the judiciary varies according to the 
circumstances of each crime. Sometimes leniency is applied to reduce sanctions one degree in 
some of these crimes and two degrees in others. In some murder crimes, capital punishment 
was replaced with the penalty of life imprisonment while in others capital punishment was 
replaced to an aggravated imprisonment. 
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B. Honor Killing and Killings not involving honor: 
 
Table 2: Honor Killings involving the application of leniency: 
 
 
The examination shows that around 265 murder crimes involved the application of Article 17 
before the court of cassation. The diagram shows that out of 265 murder crimes to which 
leniency was appealed or applied, only 9 murders were honor killings while the other 256 
murders did not involve honorary issues. In terms of percentage the study shows that only 3 
% of the murder crimes which were appealed under or involving the application of Article 17 
are honor related crimes, while the other 97 % are the usual murder crimes which vary 
according to each crime. Based on these statistics, the judiciary seems to be lenient in general 
to most of the crimes brought before them regardless of whether they relate or involve honor 
as shown on the diagram above. 
  
Regarding public wealth crimes, the examination shows that leniency is applied to a large 
number of this type of crimes. The crimes which are the most common are embezzlement, 
bribery, seizure of state money and tax evasion. 
 
The leniency of the judiciary is also present in the crimes occurring or relating to public 
officials. Crimes occurring/relating to the public officials to which leniency is applied the 
most often are assaulting a public official, torturing inmates and arbitrary arrest. 
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Leniency can be also found under the appeals of other miscellaneous crimes as shown in the 
table. The miscellaneous crimes to which leniency is applied has no specific norm. They can 
encompass crimes as slaughtering female stock or passing cheques with no sufficient funds. 
 
C. A closer look to the honor killings reviewed before the court of cassation: 
 
Having a closer look at the crimes involving honor submitted before the court of cassation 
under appeal or involving the application of leniency, one may find appeals which assumes 
that the leniency of the judiciary is not necessarily applied to crimes involving honor 
whenever they are brought before the latter courts. The reasoning of the court of cassation on 
the appeals of these cases makes it somehow clear that to a considerable extent to how the 
application of leniency is implemented in realities of court trials.  
 
Case # 1: 
 
An appeal examined before the court of cassation on December 21, 1948 in which a husband 
killed his wife for getting pregnant from incest.
137
  
 
The court of the subject matter applied leniency to the accused.
138
 The latter appealed the 
sentence rendered before the court of cassation on the ground of misapplication of law and 
pleaded the application of Article 237 of the penal code.  
 
The court of cassation rejected the appeal reasoning its rejection on the fact the defendant 
killed his wife after he knew that she got pregnant from incest. The court stated that analogy 
cannot be made to legal exceptions as the one stipulated under Article 237 of the penal code, 
thus the defendant cannot benefit from the application of such article.  
 
Case # 2: 
 
The appeal examined dates to April 20, 1954 where a man who deliberately killed his female 
family member in the governorate of Qena, Upper Egypt Region.
139
 He admitted killing her 
as he knew that she had gotten pregnant through incest. The man accompanied the victim to a 
remote area where he beats her to death with a heavy stick. The man admitted committing 
this crime as citing defending the honor of the family. He was prosecuted under Article 234/1 
                                                 
137
 Appeal No. 2131/Judicial Year 18/Court of Cassation (Egypt). 
138
 The appeal examined is very ancient which dates back to 1948 and only the information summarized above 
which could be rendered out of the copy of the appeal. 
139
 Appeal No. 257/Judicial Year 24/Court of Cassation (Egypt). 
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of the penal code which stipulates that whoever intentionally kills a person without 
premeditation shall be sanctioned with life or hard labor imprisonment.
140
 The pregnancy of 
the victim was confirmed by the forensic medical report.  
 
The court examining the subject matter sentenced the man to ten years of hard labor 
imprisonment. The latter appealed to the court of cassation on the basis of bad reasoning and 
the request of application of Article 17 of the penal code. The court of cassation rejected the 
accused’s appeal. It based its refusal on the fact that intent could be deduced from the 
numerous severe hits which the accused directed to the victim’s head and body causing her 
death. This was according to the autopsy’s report carried out by the forensic examiners. The 
court also rejected the accused’s appeal based on the lack of response of the subject matter 
court to the accused’s request to have applied Article 17 of the penal code. The competent 
court is not obliged to reply to such requests. The appeal was considered by the court of 
cassation to be of no solid basis and thus rejected the content of the appeal. 
 
Case # 3: 
 
An appeal submitted before the Court of Cassation dating back to November 1, 1976 in 
which a defendant, in Upper Egypt, deliberately killed both his wife and mother in law for 
their bad reputation and sexual misconduct.
141
 The defendant confessed before the 
prosecution that after he returned from his travel he heard of his wife’s bad reputation and 
sexual misconduct. He admitted killing both his wife and mother in law as after a fight they 
had about this issue. He got prosecuted under Article 234 of the penal code. 
 
The court deciding on the subject matter sentenced the accused to 7 years of an aggravated 
prison. The court applied Article 17 of the penal code to the accused. The accused appealed 
the sentence on the ground of misapplication of law and bad reasoning. The appellant stated 
that the confession before the court was not detailed and is not sufficient to sentence him to 
the rendered punishment. He pleaded the application of Article 237 of the penal code instead 
of Article 234.  
 
The court of cassation rejected the appeal reasoning its rejection on the fact that the defendant 
admitted before both the prosecution and the court that he intentionally killed both his wife 
and mother in law as they informed him that they are free to do whatever they want which got 
                                                 
140
 Law No. 58 of 1937 (Criminal Code of 1937, reformed in 1952), Al-Waqi’a al-Misriyah 5 Aug. 1937 
(Egypt). 
141
 Appeal No. 615/Judicial Year 46/Court of Cassation (Egypt). 
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him provoked and thus killing them. The court stated that Article 237 of the penal code was 
inapplicable to the case of the appellant.  
 
Case # 4: 
 
An appeal was examined before Cairo Court of Cassation on February 14, 1977 in which the 
defendant deliberately killed the deceased for the sake of honor.
142
 The first defendant killed 
the deceased using a chopper and threw his victim in the river with the aid of the other 
defendant. The other defendant only aided the other defendant in throwing away the body of 
the deceased. The prosecution prosecuted both defendants under Article 234 of the penal 
code. 
 
The court of the subject matter sentenced the first defendant to 7 years of an aggravated 
prison while the other defendant was sentenced to 1 year of imprisonment. The court applied 
Article 17 to both defendants. The first defendant appealed the rendered sentence on the 
ground of nullity of procedures. The defendant appealed that before the first court both 
defendants had the same lawyer which constituted a conflict of interest as the first defended 
was accused of intended murder while the other was accused of hiding the body of the 
deceased.  
 
The court of cassation considered the appeal admissible based on the conflict of interest 
existed before the court of the subject matter that both defendants had the same lawyer. The 
court appealed the sentence and returned it to a different court to re-examine the case.
143
 
 
Case # 5: 
 
An appeal examined before the court of cassation on March 13, 1977, in which a husband 
deliberately killed his wife after becoming suspicious about her sexual conduct.
144
 The man 
was prosecuted for intentionally killing the victim with a knife. He got her alone in their 
bedroom and stabbed her several stabs intending to kill her. The autopsy report emphasized 
that these stabs was the direct cause of her death. The prosecution prosecuted the accused 
under Article 234/1 of the penal code. 
 
                                                 
142
 Appeal No. 1021/Judicial Year 46/Court of Cassation (Egypt). 
143
 The re-examined case could not be traced and was not found on the database of the Egyptian Court of 
Cassation.  
144
 Appeal No. 1213/Judicial Year 46/Court of Cassation (Egypt). 
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The Giza Felonies Court deciding on the subject matter sentenced the accused to 15 years of 
an aggravated imprisonment according to the penalty empowered to it under Article 234/1 of 
the penal code. The accused appealed the court’s ruling before the court of cassation based on 
several grounds. Mainly poor reasoning and misapplication of law. Firstly, he questioned the 
former court’s decision regarding premeditation. The appellant argued that the court was not 
determined whether the killing was intentional or not. Secondly, he pleaded that the court 
deciding on the subject matter tackled the motivation or the reason behind the commitment of 
the crime while the motivation of the crime is not an element of the crime. Thirdly, the court 
reasoned the presence of intent because the accused used a sharp instrument in his crime and 
stabbed the victim several times causing her death. In reality, the accused should be tried for 
battery leading to death and had to be tried according to Article 237 of the penal code. 
Fourthly, the defense pleaded that sanctioning the accused left his children with no one to 
depend and entailed the competent court’s leniency and its application of Article 17 of the 
penal code. 
 
The court of cassation responded to the defense’s first appeal. The court stated that there was 
no hesitation at the competent court’s side about whether the crime was premeditated or not. 
The court of cassation reasoned the non-existence of such premeditation as the appellant had 
ongoing disputes with the victim, and in their last dispute she was killed. The court also 
acknowledged that the appellant did not specially prepare the knife used for his crime as it 
was already there in their domicile’s kitchen. As for the second pleading that the competent 
court considered the motivation and the reason behind the crime while they do not constitute 
an element of the crime, the court of cassation replied that the court of the subject matter did 
tackle the motivation and the reasons behind the crime committed, but did not rely on them in 
their rulings. While the court found the intent of killing ambiguous, they believed that the 
presence of such intent is based on the fact that the weapon used was a lethal weapon; knife. 
Moreover the severity of the stabs which the appellant directed to his victim till the latter 
passed away makes the presence of the intent of killing undebatable. Added to that, the court 
of cassation’s response to the request for the court’s leniency, is at the court’s sole discretion 
with no review of the reasons behind applying such leniency is necessary. 
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Case # 6: 
 
The case dates back to March 4, 1987. The case is of a husband who deliberately killed his 
wife for her bad sexual reputation and misconduct.
145
 He admitted before the prosecution that 
they fought over her sexual misconduct and bad reputation. He stabbed her several times 
using a penknife immediately when she confessed the name of her lover and he did not stop 
till she has fallen dead on the ground. The prosecution prosecuted the accused under Article 
234/1. 
 
The Cairo Felonies Court deciding on the subject matter sentenced the accused to ten years of 
prison. The court applied Article 17 of the penal code to the accused. The accused appealed 
the court’s ruling before the court of cassation based on several grounds. He appealed based 
on poor reasoning, misapplication of law and prejudice to the right of defense. He pleaded his 
loss of awareness as he was treated of severe depression by the time he committed his crime. 
He followed that it was clear to the court deciding on the subject matter when it asked the 
accused about the crime, the latter cried and muttered incomprehensible words. Thus the 
court should have resorted to expertise to decide on his mental awareness. He also pleaded 
the absence of the intent of killing as it is obvious that a fight has taken place between him 
and the victim right before the crime. 
 
The court of cassation rejected the defendant’s appeal and reasoned its rejection on several 
grounds. First, the accused admitted his crime in details before the prosecution as he 
confessed killing his wife as they fought about her sexual misconduct and bad reputation on 
the spot she uttered the name of her lover. The court emphasized on the presence of the intent 
of killing as the accused stabbed his victim using the penknife several times and did not stop 
till she was completely dead leaving her on the ground. The appeal was considered by the 
court of cassation to be of no solid basis and thus rejected the content of the appeal. 
 
Case # 7: 
 
The case dates back to March 10, 1997 as a husband suffering from impotence deliberately 
killed his wife for being suspicious about her sexual conduct.
146
 He admitted before the 
prosecution that he killed his wife as he doubted that she is engaged in a sexual affair. The 
accused confessed that he fought with the victim and choked her to death using a piece of 
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cloth. He admitted that the victim used to mention his sexual disability whenever they fight 
but he could not bear the insult on their last fight and he killed her. The accused further 
admitted that he killed his daughter as he doubted her blood relationship. The prosecution got 
him prosecuted under Article 234 of the penal code. 
 
The court deciding on the subject matter sentenced the accused to life time imprisonment. 
The court applied replaced the capital punishment by the sentence rendered by applying 
Article 17 of the penal code to the accused. The accused appealed the sentence based on the 
grounds of misapplication of law and bad reasoning. He pleaded the misapplication of law on 
the basis that the court should have applied Article 237 of the penal code instead of Article 
234. He emphasized that he killed his wife as she was in a state of adultery.  
 
The court of cassation rejected the appeal. The court reasoned that it was not proved that the 
wife was caught committing adultery as the perpetrator confessed before the prosecution in 
details that he killed his victim as the latter mentioned his sexual disability during their last 
fight, thus, he brought a piece of cloth and choked her to death. The accused admitted that he 
also killed his daughter as he doubted her blood bond. The court further reasoned that the 
accused came back home and doubted the presence of a stranger in house and as he faced the 
deceased with his doubts, she mocked his sexual disability which got him provoked and 
killed her on the spot without being certain of the presence of someone or even without 
tracing any. The court of cassation rejected the appeal as it is of no solid ground and the non-
applicability of Article 237 of the penal code. 
 
Case # 8: 
 
An Appeal dating to October 21, 1997 in which two brothers deliberately killed the wife of 
their third brother.
147
 The defendants admitted before the court that they killed the deceased 
for her bad sexual conduct and reputation. They entered the deceased’s house after the 
departure of the latter’s husband. They threw her on the ground and choked her to death, then 
they burnt her after making sure she was no longer breathing. They confessed that their crime 
was meant to clean their honor from the disgrace the deceased brought to their family. The 
prosecution prosecuted the defendants under Articles 230, 231 and 234 of the penal code.
148
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 Appeal No. 16231/Judicial Year 65/Court of Cassation (Egypt). 
148
 Articles 230 and 231 of the penal code stipulated that whoever premeditatedly murders another person faces 
the capital punishment. 
47 
 
The court examining the subject matter sentenced the defendants to life imprisonment. The 
court replaced the capital punishment with the rendered punishment by applying Article 17 of 
the penal code. The defendants appealed the ruling based on the ground of bad reasoning. 
They appealed that their confession was rendered under duress. They emphasized that their 
confession before the court was not in details. 
 
The court of cassation reasoned its rejection to the appeal of the defendants based on that 
although their confession before the court was not in details, however, they admitted and 
simulated their crime before the prosecution. The court of cassation rejected the appeal as it is 
of no solid ground. 
 
Case # 9: 
 
An appeal examined before the court of cassation on March 11, 2001 in which a brother 
deliberately killed his sister for getting pregnant from incest.
149
 The accused drugged the 
deceased by convincing the latter that those medical tablets helps her to get rid of the fetus. 
After she lost conscious he choked her to death with a wet piece of cloth. The prosecution 
prosecuted the accused under Articles 230 and 231 of the penal code. 
 
The court deciding on the subject matter sentenced the accused to ten years of an aggravated 
prison. The court replaced the sentence of capital punishment by the rendered sentence by 
applying Article 17 of the penal code. The defendant appealed the sentence based on the 
ground of bad reasoning. He appealed that the autopsy report did not state explicitly that the 
assault of the defendant is the direct cause of death.  
 
The court of cassation rejected the defendant’s appeal. It based its reasoning on the fact that 
the defendant intentionally provided the deceased with some medical tablets and he waited 
till she fainted and then he choked her to death. The court stated that the autopsy report stated 
that the deceased’s stomach contained drugs. The court cleared that it has no doubt that the 
assault on the deceased by the defendant was the cause of the former’s death, in addition to 
the defendant’s confession before the prosecution. 
 
From both the cases summarized above, one may not draw a decisive conclusion on whether 
the tendency of judges has changed over time towards honor crimes or not. First, it should be 
noted that none of the appeals summarized indicated that the application of leniency to the 
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perpetrators was based on the fact that these cases involved honorary issues. One can only 
recognize that these appeals involve honor from the facts of each case. The reason behind this 
is that nothing oblige courts deciding on the subject matter to state the reasoning upon which 
they implemented Article 17 of the penal code. The only thing which matters is that judges 
merely refer to the fact that they applied leniency to the perpetrators of the crime.
150
 Second, 
from the analysis of the appeals examined, one may find that judiciary has widely applied 
Article 17 of the penal code not only murder cases but also to illegal possession of drugs, 
illicit weapons  and several other crimes. In addition to that, among the appeals examined 
which involve honor there was found couple of cases to which the leniency was not applied 
to the perpetrators of such type of crimes may be taken as an assumption that some crimes 
involving honor do not enjoy leniency of judges. Accordingly, one may not conclusively 
assert that the judiciary adopts a certain lenient tendency towards crimes involving honor in 
specific. 
 
Leniency is applied in a broad manner when the judiciary sees fit regardless of the type of 
crime brought before it. The assumption adopted by most of the literature supposes that the 
Egyptian judiciary are necessarily lenient to these types of crimes. However, in light of the 
analysis conducted another assumption may rise which tells that the courts often applies to a 
wide range of crimes they believe in entailing the application of the leniency in Article 17 of 
the penal code according to the circumstances of each crime. 
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 The regulations and the conditions of the application of Article 17 of the penal code is covered under chapter 
3. 
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VI. Conclusion: 
 
Most scholars assume that Egypt fully accommodates honor crimes in the penal code through 
both Articles 17 and 237. Scholars presupposes that Article 17 of the penal code guarantees 
the perpetrators of honor crimes, who do not fall under the scope of reduction in sanction 
embodied in Article 237 of the code, less serious prosecutions. They propose that it is not 
only husbands who benefit from the reduction in sanction stipulated under Article 237 but 
male paternal relatives often benefit from a reduction similar as well. The examination of the 
appeals involving the application of Article 17 of the penal code which are submitted before 
the Egyptian Court of Cassation presupposes that another assumption which provisionally 
reflects an image to the extent of the application of leniency by courts is too wide by which it 
would be hard to conclusively assume that the Egyptian judiciary adopts a lenient tendency 
towards honor crimes. The realities of court trials revealed by the analysis provided assumes 
that leniency of courts is applied in a broad manner often well beyond the crimes of honor. 
Courts gives leniency to a wide range of crimes which often includes murders for reasons 
apart from honor, illicit possession of drugs, bribery and several others. The leniency in 
Article 17 of the penal code is not necessarily a complementary article to Article 237 of the 
penal code which guarantees the perpetrators of honor of crimes less serious prosecution. 
 
*** 
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